l-to-r: President Farmajo with supportive European politicians at the Somalia Partnership Forum in Bruxelles and then meeting his Eritrean counterpart; the Ministry of Interior in Mogadishu under attack; and the tools of FGM

JULY began with continued rumblings around the release of the ONLF leader, Qalbi Dhagax, and the broader thaw in relations with Somalia’s previous arch-enemy, Ethiopia. President Farmaajo travelled to Turkey to congratulate President Erdogan on his re-election as president and later in the month, in a parallel thaw, travelled to Eritrea to meet with President Afwerki.

The Somalia Partnership Forum took place in Belgium, accompanied by the obligatory Jubbaland State tantrum about protocol. Parliament went into recess with much discussion in the news media of pay rates and attendance.

There were a number of high profile sackings within the FGS: the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of Education and the spokesman of the Ministry of Internal Security. Two of the National Intelligence & Security Agency’s Deputy Director Generals were also dismissed. The Mogadishu Stabilisation Force was replaced by the Civil Defence Force, prompting much speculation about a spat between the President and the Prime Minister over control of the security forces. This reminded many of the previous disruption caused during the period of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, which was scarred by frequent power struggles between the President and his numerous Prime Ministers.

In the Federal Member States (FMSs), South West State seemed to lurch to the oppressive with a prohibition on criticism of the incumbent authorities but this was possibly balanced by increased external interest from both the central government and the international community. Somaliland and Puntland continued to rub against each other (and not in a nice way) over the disputed territories of Sanaag & Sool, although at the end of the month the UN attempted to broker an end to the fighting that seemed to be successful.

aS continued to kill people: elders, members of the security forces, government workers, random people walking down the street. It launched two notable complex attacks in Mogadishu against the Ministry of Interior and Villa Somalia (after a lull during the Holy Month of Ramadan), which prompted much outcry despite both being relatively paltry in yield. aS also tried to re-cast itself as an eco-friendly group by banning plastic bags in the areas it controlled, which convinced few except idle copy-writers in the international news media.

Somalia also found itself on the front-pages of many newspapers because one of its greatest source of collective shame: female genital mutilation. A 10-year old girl died during the vandalism of her genitals in Somaliland and there seemed to be a genuine effort, backed by the Mayor of Mogadishu, to drive the activity out of the country. But it was unclear how effective any campaign to end the hideous practice would be until control of the hinterland of Somalia was complete and tacit tolerance was stamped out once and for all.

l-to-r: Diriye, who might be dead; Qalbi Dhagah on his way into and then out of captivity; & the new Somali shilling

JUNE saw a continuation of aS’s increased pace of attacks during the Holy Month of Ramadan, with the obligatory multiple attacks in the hinterland and numerous assassinations. A US soldier was killed and others injured in fighting in the Jubba River Valley, which sadly eclipsed the results of the US investigation into a recent accusation of civ cas.

To counter the stream of assassinations in Mogadishu, the security forces set up a special undercover squad to try to interdict the assassins. The ISIS/Da’esh Faction issued many videos, aS a few. Checkpoints were enhanced in an attempt to interdict complex attacks: some members of the public expressed peevishness about the hassle of being searched, but the broader consensus was that being delayed was better than being blown up. But ultimately Eid al-Fitr came without any major incident in the city and the read from sensible commentators was that aS’s 2018 Ramadan campaign was a flop.

There was much speculation about the health of the Emir of aS, Diriye, possibly as part of a ‘draw’ to force the elusive leader to expose himself in the media (and, therefore, to targeting), possibly based on fact. Robow, on the other hand, was in fine fettle, and went on pilgrimage to Mecca as part of a tried and tested process of symbolic atonement and reintegration.

The National Security Council met in Baidoa and issued a wide-ranging statement: about enhanced support to Galmudug and Puntland in combatting aS; about the commitment to the 2020 Election and the principal of one-man, one-vote; and about securing rural arteries (because secure towns without secure roads in between them are pointless). The Council for Internal Cooperation met amid continued tensions between Somaliland and Puntland. The PM visited Norway and Rwanda.

The Ethiopian Prime Minister visited and a succession of events followed, possibly related, possibly not: there were rumours of port deals; Ethiopia issued a broad amnesty which included the ONLF leader, Qalbi Dhagah, who had been handed over to the Ethiopians in 2017 by the FGS; and the Ethiopian General Gebre, a hate figure for many Somalis for his alleged actions during the 2006 invasion, was dismissed from IGAD. There was much nationalistic fury.

Stormy weather continued to threaten to turn into a humanitarian crisis and the fishing industry suffered. The Banadir Regional Authority began to demolish structures built illegally on public land. A cunning new plan to persuade pirate gangs to release their remaining captives (many of whom had been simply abandoned by their shipping companies and, in some cases, their home countries) by paying ‘expenses’ rather than ransoms seemed to be successful.

The impending exchange of the existing Somali shilling for new, verified notes ran into difficulties when currency traders rejected the current notes. This was a pity, since a rejuvenated Somali Shilling represented a symbol of progress in financial transparency and maybe even a symbol of national unity for people to gather around.

l-r: flooding; a German ICRC nurse who was kidnapped in Mogadishu; a gory image from an ISIS/Da’esh Faction assassination video; and the alleged assassins in custody

MAY began with the confirmation of the new Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament. The discussion of the Constitution continued, although Jubbaland boycotted, claiming it had not been formally invited. Vacant cabinet posts were filled amid a broader reshuffle. The President sacked the Chief Justice, prompting the obligatory claims that he couldn’t, but his youthful appointee took office nonetheless.

Two cyclones made landfall on the Somali coast and unseasonable storms resulted in flooding across the country: national examinations were postponed and there were predictions of a cholera epidemic. A German female nurse working for ICRC in Mogadishu was kidnapped, allegedly by an insider.

The one apparent constant in Somalia, the ability to do business in spite of the turmoil, came into question. A Cypriot company sued for breach over a coastguard contract and other international actors began to queue up with similar claims. Having failed to implement taxation in the city of Mogadishu, elements of the Federal Government shifted their focus to elements of the international community operating within the Mogadishu International Airport (MIA) compound, lifting a few South-East Asian accounts clerks to prove a point. A contract with an international provider to provide logistic support to the SNA that had been discarded due to questions about the transparency of the tender process suddenly reappeared in the hands of a local provider.

At the same time, the UAE’s controversial port contract with Somaliland seemed to be progressing in spite of the central government’s objections. Elsewhere in the Federal Member States, the illegal charcoal trade allegedly resumed in Jubbaland (if it had ever actually stopped), and Somaliland and Puntland clashed yet again over the disputed territories between the two states. FMSs continued to slap rather than pat when dealing with internal dissent.

International relations alternated between soft and hard power approaches, depending which side the international actor was supporting (the FGS or the FMSs). The US presence apparently rose, then fell. There were yet more aS-inspired claims of civilian casualties in the South/Central hinterland, where no international commentator can genuinely verify the truth but where agendas roam free.

aS continued to claim every killing everywhere as a politically-motivated assassination by its death squads. Operations were conducted across the border into Kenya and there was a spike in its activities in Puntland. MIA was rocketed, although at its relatively unpopulated southern extremity. A market in Garowe was bombed and a woman stoned to death for alleged adultery. The ISIS/Da’esh Faction mounted a series of assassinations too, but with a considerably quicker pace of media release than the perfectionist aS auteurs: a pair of alleged ISIS/Da’esh assassins were lifted 24 hours after a video release, wearing the same clothes as in the product that was released the day before. Some questioned why it was so easy to interdict the ISIS/Da’esh Faction assassins but not aS.

The Holy Month of Ramadan began with everyone in Mogadishu looking over their shoulder for an assassin: whether the assassin was aS, ISIS/Da’esh or just someone providing a 9 millimetre solution to a dispute seemed the only variable. But there were no major bombings or complex attacks, and the capital held its collective breath.

l-r: Speaker Jawari resigns; the Mogadishu Mini-Marathon; the Ocean Stars in the CECAFA U-17s Cup Final

APRIL picked up where March left off, with continuing friction around the apparent spat between the PM and the Speaker of the Lower House. Security forces and the media were encouraged to remain impartial in an increasingly tense environment. Eventually the AMISOM Ugandan Contingent Commander intervened, apparently unilaterally, and restored some degree of calm. Speaker Jawari eventually decided to resign: barring some accusations that he had been bought off (which he vigorously refuted), his exit was remarkably equable given the bitterness that had gone before. Mohamed Mursal was elected in his place.

The FGS worked hard to increase revenues and, at the same time, secure some degree of debt relief. The constitution document apparently went missing but then re-appeared. An SNA logistics contract with the international provider, SKA, was ruled null and void after probing by investigative journalists. Flooding following heavy rains wrecked havoc in the hinterland, especially Hiraan. International organisations predicted an associated cholera epidemic and a major relief effort was launched.

In the FMSs, AMISOM continued to integrate Darwish militias into the security forces, this time in Jubbaland. Somaliland’s lurch to the oppressive continued: an elder jailed for attending an event in Puntland; a female poet detained for making pro-Somali unity proclamations; and a journalist arrested for being a journalist.

The orientation of Somaliland with UAE, presumably driven by the UAE’s investment in Somaliland ports and infrastructure but with a security angle as well, further aggravated the central government. The war of words escalated into the seizing of nearly $10 million from a UAE-flagged plane: the UAE claimed it was wages for the troops it was training in Somalia, the FGS claimed it was bung money. The UAE promptly withdrew its support for its SNA training facility in Mogadishu and its hospitals suspended operations. The military facility was looted, flooding Mogadishu with weapons and other military paraphernalia. As the month ended Somaliland, Puntland and Jubbaland were all firmly aligned with the UAE against the FGS (and Qatar/Turkey).

aS in turn launched a series of coordinated attacks on AMISOM and SNA positions in the hinterland, but they were successfully repelled. Unfortunately, a lack of availability of anyone in authority to speak to the media meant that aS’s narrative, of it swarming across south-central Somalia, was allowed to take hold.

Having finally learnt how to counter the effectiveness of drone strikes through disinformation, aS issued a series of articles claiming that strikes were consistently killing Elders, pregnant women and camels (showing what aS thinks matters to the average Somali in the hinterland). aS targeted checkpoints in the city of Mogadishu with car-bombs, warning citizens to stay away or risk the consequences. This didn’t stop the Mogadishu Mini-Marathon being run, a testament to the stoicism and resilience of the Somali people.

Sport provided another target for aS, this time a football stadium in Barawe in Lower Shabelle: aS claimed all those injured were members of the security forces, but the reality was that they were all just average Abdi’s playing the beautiful game. On the flip-side, the Somali Under-17s team reached the final of the CECAFA Cup, only faltering at the end to a stronger Tanzanian side. For every negative, there was a positive. And vice versa.

l-r: the President and the UN SRSG at the Mogadishu Security Conference; policewomen parade at the Police Academy, a number of whom died in an aS suicide attack on the base; Robow meets Ahmed Madobe; and Abdishakur is released from custody after a storm of protests

DECEMBER began with the announcement that a second investigation was to be launched into events in Barire, which were being portrayed on one hand as US Special Forces on the rampage and as a cynical, compensation-driven misrepresentation of a bit of inter-clan scrapping on the other. But the US nonetheless continued its high tempo of strikes, disrupting aS’s pattern of life.

The US also suspended military aid to the SNA, citing endemic corruption: the FGS stated that it agreed with the move. The reality of the state of the Somali security forces – weak and sometimes dishonest leadership, lacking in numbers, equipment and capability, nowhere near ready to assume responsibility for security and all while AMISOM begins its drawdown – became painfully apparent.

A major security conference for international partners was hosted by the FGS in Mogadishu and the 2018 budget was approved, although with the obligatory procedural protests from the Upper House. Political parties were introduced in anticipation of the 2020 elections and Somalia regained control of its airspace.

The President travelled to Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt and Turkey: in Istanbul he attended a meeting of the OIC and added Somalia’s voice to the protests against President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. A US diplomat to Somalia resigned, her furious resignation letter splashed across the news media.

Other international partners – Turkey & Qatar on one side, Saudi Arabia, the UAE & Egypt on the other – seemed to be vying for influence through soft power (development aid and direct donations) while at the same time conducting intrigue in support of their national or bloc objectives. Kenya refused to accept the ICJ’s decision on the maritime border with Somalia and also appeared to seize a section of the land border.

Robow returned to Southwest State and began to fight aS: aS fought back, killing one of Robow’s numerous sons, and conducted a series of executions of ‘spies’ in the areas near where Robow was operating. A suicide bomber dressed as a police officer struck the rehearsal for the 74th Anniversary of the Somali Police Force: many of the victims were female SPF officers. aS’s campaign of low level assassinations continued.

While the international community cats were away for Christmas, the Somali mice decided to play. The game was an old one: clan power disputes over control of resources and positions of influence. Clan militias in security forces uniforms clashed over land rights. The home of a former Presidential candidate, Abdishakur, was stormed on the pretext of charges of treason and six of his staff killed: he was released following a storm of protests everywhere from social media to the rural hinterland (where security forces from his clan allegedly abandoned their posts). Astonishingly, another Hawiye/Habar Gadir politician, Qeybdiid, was also raided: this time the FGS claimed to have no idea of who ordered the operation and blame was steered towards UAE (who had trained the unit involved).

As 2017 ended it was hard to remember the numerous positives of the year – a successful electoral process and the genuine feeling of hope at the election of President Farmaajo, aS on the back foot, an increasingly secure capital – while the country teetered on the brink of a descent back into clan-driven conflict.

l-r: top, an AMISOM vehicle was destroyed after being caught up in bajaaj-driver protests; bottom, Robow; centre, the alleged victims of the Barire radi; and right, Eid al-Adha, aS-style

AUGUST began with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) dealing with the aftermath of events in July: the Minister of Constitutional Affairs was summoned to parliament to explain his negative commentary regarding the overturning of the Supreme Court’s ruling on disputed parliamentary seats; and there was much outcry about the death sentence applied to the killer of the Minister of Public Works (the perpetrator being one of the Attorney General’s protection team).

Later in the month an AMISOM convoy in Mogadishu became caught up in a mass protest by disgruntled bajaaj­-drivers: one vehicle was destroyed. There was a flurry of attacks on checkpoints in Mogadishu (possibly indicative of the success of the Stabilisation Force) and a handful of car-bombs made it through to their targets, although with minimal effect. A group of family members were killed in a drive-by shooting on the outskirts of Mogadishu and a taxi driver working the lucrative Airport Road route was killed by a bomb placed under the driver’s seat of his cab: it seemed that, as terrorism in the city declined, business dispute resolution, Mogadishu-style, was returning.

Female representation in parliament also came to the fore when no female representatives were selected for the Constitutional Review Committee, prompting comment from UN SOM. The Telecoms Bill passed through both houses, meaning the FGS might finally see a share of the massive revenues from that industry (which currently go into private coffers and, allegedly, also in some small part to aS). There was turmoil in HirShabelle State, always the most fragile of the Federal States, when the President was voted out but refused to leave, despite the support of the central government for the process to remove him from office. Convicted pirates were repatriated by India. Another group of prisoners were returned to Mogadishu by South Sudan and were immediately released: unfortunately they turned out to be human traffickers.

aS maintained its campaign to influence the Kenyan election via the media, culminating in the release of a video showing the execution of a Kenyan prisoner. AMISOM and the FGS withdrew from Leego: aS re-occupied the town. A female suicide bomber detonated in the Central Prison in Mogadishu in an attempt to kill her relative, the Commander of the Custodial Corps: she failed. aS continued to suffer losses to strikes: air strikes, drone strikes, Special Forces strikes. The Shadow Governor of Banadir, Ali Jabal, was a significant loss, prompting a eulogy from aQ itself.

Defections continued, including a 19-year medical commander in Hiraan. The defection of Robow, probably prompted by aS’s attempts to finally eliminate him after years of his dithering in the wilderness, was the subject of much conjecture: was he significant? did he actually reject violence or the ideology of the Global Jihad? was there a chance he might destabilise Southwest State, to whom he defected?

The month ended with two more crises. A group of villagers were killed in a joint Somali-US special forces operation, prompting outrage (much of it faux, since it became apparent the group were armed and probably about to engage in a spot of inter-clan violence when they stumbled upon the soldiers). The alleged handover of an Ogaden National Liberation Front leader to the Ethiopian authorities saw indignation reach new levels. Eid al-Adha came and the celebrations were peaceful but the various controversies rumbled on in the background and would likely ripple on into September.